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The social dumping debate in Europe is taking place parallel to broader debates on the changing 
relationship between society and the market. Varieties of capitalism theorists argue that little has 
changed in Europe’s advanced industrialized economies since the 1980s, aside from the 
expansion of the ‘peripheral’ workforce relative to the ‘core’ (Emmenegger et al 2011). Most 
observers, however, see fundamental change, with detrimental implications for Europe’s 
workforce, and not just labor-market ‘outsiders’. According to the ‘liberalization’ argument, for 
example, the problem is not only that the increasing size of a less-regulated workforce; in 
addition, the function of industrial relations arrangements for those workers who are still covered 
by welfare state provisions, democratic co-determination rights, and sectoral encompassing 
collective agreements is changing (Baccaro and Howell 2009; Doellgast 2012). This process is 
biased against social protections for workers and the poor in part due to the corrosive features of 
market-making regulation emanating from the institutions of the European Union (Höpner and 
Schäfer 2009; Lillie 2010; Meardi 2012) and in part due to generic features of capitalism (Dörre 
2009; Vidal 2013).  
The focus of this paper is one slow-burning change in the organization of capitalism in Europe, 
marketization (Greer and Doellgast 2013, Hauptmeier 2011). We argue that a specific species of 
marketization, management whipsawing, is causing social dumping in the automotive sector. By 
management whipsawing we mean the staging of economic competition by large corporations 
with several production units in a way that extracts labor concessions by pitting local workers 
against each other in contests for investment and production. Multinational companies (MNC) 
were the first movers and developed  various management whipsawing practices; however, the 
term was also used historically to describe union whipsawing at large national corporations with 
several production units (Ross 1948). Management whipsawing presupposes the ability to move 
production from one location to another, due to (for example) the standardization of production 
techniques, production of similar products in parallel at different locations, and unutilized 
production capacity.  
Numerous studies, whose findings we will discuss below, have examined whipsawing in the auto 
industry, mainly as a way of discussing the prospects for transnational industrial relations in 
Europe. Our contribution is to place this evidence in the context of marketization and social 
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dumping. Social dumping is defined in Bernaciak’s introduction to this book as ‘a strategy 
geared to the lowering of wage and/or social standards for the sake of enhanced competitiveness, 
which is pursued by companies and indirectly involves their employees and home or host 
governments’. The large-scale imposition of market relations in Europe over the past few 
decades makes these practices both inevitable and pervasive. Social dumping is inevitable in the 
sense that the business community has a strong material incentive to use competition as a lever to 
extract concessions from labor and the state. Worker representatives, however sophisticated their 
countervailing strategies are, and however many years they have to develop them (Greer and 
Hauptmeier 2012), cannot really stop social dumping under the current institutional setup of 
European capitalism. Social dumping is pervasive in the sense that it takes so many different 
forms that it no longer requires a credible threat to relocate work from a high-wage country to a 
poor country. As research on service mobility and worker posting shows, for example, social 
dumping driven by European market-making can also take place without international relocation 
of production (Lillie 2010; Lillie and Wagner 2014), and the literature on the automotive sector 
is full of cases of competition between high-wage locations (see Bernaciak 2012).  
This paper follows this argument through in three steps. First, we introduce the concept of 
whipsawing and discuss certain similarities with other forms of marketization. In addition to 
intense competition, different kinds of marketization have in common several knock-on effects: 
the disorganization of non-market social protections due to threats of exit, the development of 
private regulation by economic elites to extract profits, and the decline in workers’ power, 
income, and security. Second, we show how this dynamic has played out in the automotive 
sector since the 1990s drawing on the literature on problems faced by European Works Councils. 
We use these case studies to show the diverse workings of the market mechanism within these 
firms as they whipsaw, the inadequacy of the industrial relations institutions to break this 
process, and the difficulties faced by worker representatives in retaining jobs and bargaining with 
management. Third, we discuss the implications of whipsawing for the social dumping debate, 
including the role of governments and multinational firms and the necessity of new forms of 
transnational social regulation beyond the firm, at the scale of the market. 
 
1. Whipsawing as marketization 
Whipsawing entails the use of market mechanisms in allocating the resources large corporations 
for extracting labor concessions. This makes it a powerful level for social dumping. This is 
hardly a case of ‘deregulation’; like privatization, outsourcing, or free trade, it is institutionally 
thick, requires rules, and has complex organizational dynamics (MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio 
2005; Crouch 2011). Despite being enabled by the rollback of various rules that restricted the 
flow of manufactured goods and capital across national boundaries it is often imposed through 
the rules and practices of  large, often multinational, corporations. While markets are often 
3 
 
treated as something outside of the control of firms and states, of central interest to us is the 
‘staging’ of competition by large firms (Brinkmann 2011).  
We define marketization as the introduction or intensification of price-based competition (Greer 
and Doellgast 2013). Under whipsawing, a transaction takes place between central management 
and the local workforces, in which concessions are exchanged for investment. Rather than each 
plant having a fixed, dedicated, and idiosyncratic production palate, the purpose of each plant is 
decided anew, mostly based on labor and production costs. This can be timed to correspond with 
the turnover of models and cycles of investments, but if production is highly standardized can the 
relocation of production can also take place on short notice  in the middle of a production cycle. 
The competition for investment is determined not only by plant construction and closure, but 
also the standardization of production, the extent of parallel production and in some sectors 
production platform. In exchange for production allocation and investments, management asks 
labor representatives from different plants to pay a price in form of labor concessions. While the 
price mechanism is often obscure to worker representatives, it can be made more transparent to 
them with improved access to company information or with a formal procedure. This, while free 
trade has increased the amount of competition in the product market as a whole, there is wide 
variation in the way whipsawing proceeds within large corporations, in terms of frequency of 
transaction, the number of competitors, and the working of the price mechanism. 
This has disorganizing effects on collective bargaining and worker representation institutions, 
mainly due to the exit threat (Hirschman 1970). Because firms are able to move production away 
from a location, workers have less power in negotiations. The consequence is that the function of 
collective bargaining changes from one of ensuring worker voice, fair pay, or macro-economic 
stability due to strong worker demand; instead labor representatives focus on production 
allocation with the aim of securing jobs and previous labor gains. This is the case, because key 
labor outcomes can only be defended if plants run at full capacity. Workers in underutilized 
plants face job losses or closure in the context of tight product markets. Along the way, as we 
will show below, multinationals import new practices into national institutional contexts where 
they had previously been resisted. Thus multinationals have greater latitude in how they ‘enact’ 
the rules of an industrial relations system (Wagner 2014) and are therefore less constrained by 
these rules. The availability of domestic exit options via outsourcing gives them even stronger 
bargaining power in various support services where, outside the larger companies, low wages 
prevail (Doellgast and Greer 2007).  
In other forms of marketization that hinge on public regulation, states engage in ‘quiet politics’ 
in which policymakers defer to the expertise of the business community (Culpepper 2011); in 
whipsawing the regulatory practices are within the private firm. There are the practices of 
making the market: how investment decisions are made, and if there is formal tendering, how 
that is organized. (Such private regulation also takes place in sourcing auto parts – see the 
Telljohann paper in this volume). This process matters for distribution, not only of income, but 
also power and security. Corporate managers have whipsawing as a tool to battle the profit 
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squeeze caused by the saturation of the market – i.e. its highly competitive nature, overall excess 
production capacity, and the absence of  stable growth. The result is concession bargaining: 
unionized workers in industrial cores lose their ability to make gains. There are also numerous 
example of whipsawing used to target concessions at particularly vulnerable groups of workers, 
such as young people and workers in easy-to-outsource support services.  This process 
presupposes a sense of insecurity across the workforce, including ‘core’ workers in automotive 
assembly jobs. While this insecurity has obvious negative implications for the power of trade 
unions and works councils, it can also lead them to become influential as co-managers if they 
focus their efforts on topics where they can agree with management on ‘mutual gains’. 
By focusing on whipsawing, this chapter raises the question of what is gained from a 
marketization analysis as opposed to recent developments in comparative political economy 
stressing dualization (and attempting to rescue traditional varieties of capitalism theory by 
distinguishing between labor-market insiders and outsiders) and liberalization (which largely 
rejects this distinction). Studying marketization, however, supports the latter position in focusing 
on the importance of changes in market relations and their effects across the workforce. It moves 
beyond the liberalization discussion, however, by examining the micro-level institutions 
governing competition that are outside the realm of the welfare state and industrial relations. In 
order to understand why the distributive outcome of this process is so biased against workers, we 
do not only examine the disorganizing face of market making. We also examine the rise of new 
regulatory arrangements, which in this case are built into the multinational corporation and 
govern both industrial relations and investment decisions. 
 
2. Whipsawing and its effects in the auto industry 
Management whipsawing more widely emerged during the 1980s at the American  firms General 
Motors and Ford (Katz 1985; Turner 1991) and during the 1990s and 2000s spread to European 
firms, including and the Italian and German car makers FIAT, Volkswagen (VW) and Daimler 
Benz (Hauptmeier and Greer 2008, Meardi 2000). In Europe whipsawing emerged within the 
context of the liberalization of market rules and the creation of a single European auto market, 
which made it easier for companies to integrate production networks and shift production across 
borders. Whipsawing did not merely take place due to competition between high-wage and low-
wage locations, although this did happen. Lower-wage locations in Southern Europe were also 
threatened or closed, and often competition was staged between high-wage locations. While the 
best-known cases of whipsawing were competitions between locations in different countries, 
there were also instances of competition between locations in Germany. 
The diversity of whipsawing. Over the last three decades a number of different types of 
management whipsawing emerged (Greer and Hauptmeier 2012). In the context of increasing 
market competition in Europe, management pursued two contradictory goals simultaneously. On 
5 
 
the one hand, managers sought to extract concessions and reduce labor costs through 
whipsawing. On the other hand, managers sought to establish labor-management partnership to 
ensure high-quality production, which managers also regarded as essential for surviving in 
highly competitive markets. Companies struck this balance between forcing and fostering in 
different ways (Walton & McKersie 1965), which shaped the emergence of various whipsawing 
practices.  
An initial standard type was coercive whipsawing (Mueller & Purcell 1992; Katz 1993): 
management pitched different plants in competition over production against each other and 
explicitly threatened the plants targeted to shift production to other plants if the concessions were 
not high enough. Because this type of whipsawing regularly disrupted labor-management 
relations and led to conflict, management engaged in informal whipsawing. In these instances, 
local managers informally and casually mentioned that production decision were coming up. 
This friendly tip by local managers often took place before collective bargaining rounds. Without 
explicitly threating to shift production, the logic of the hints were clear. Labor was supposed to 
agree to concessions or even to suggest them, if they wanted to be considered for new production 
and investments by regional or world headquarters.   
Another management strategy to balance collaboration and coercion in a different manner was 
the introduction of rule-based whipsawing. In these instances managers sought to establish clear 
rules and expectations for the competitive assignment of production with the goal to increase the 
legitimacy of the process. Management introduced a bidding process between competing plants, 
and plants with the best bid, meaning among other things higher labor concessions, would 
receive the greatest share of production or the entire production volume. In effect, management 
created a within company market for the allocation of production (Hauptmeier 2011). An 
accompanying rhetoric was often that management generally pointed to the efficiency and 
fairness of markets in societies, and thus management suggested that the market mechanism is a 
fair allocation principle even if it would lead to concessions.  
Finally, managers developed hegemonic whipsawing. In this type of whipsawing, managers 
spent considerable time and resources to influence labor representatives’ ideas, seeking to 
convince them that whipsawing was necessary to survive in highly competitive auto markets 
(Hauptmeier 2012, Greer and Hauptmeier 2012). Management argued that the competitive 
assignment of production was necessary to stay ‘fit’ in competition with other firms. This 
discourse regularly connected with the sports-oriented and competitive mental frames of male 
labor representatives.  
Coercive whipsawing was the dominant form at GM Europe between 1995 and 2003. It involved 
extracting concessions through explicit threats to move production. This was underpinned by 
benchmarking of performance and practices, which allowed firms to compare locations for 
purposes of making demands in collective bargaining. Coercive whipsawing was used in 
landmark concession bargaining in in Germany, Belgium and the UK in 1995 and 1998, but it 
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was also used to discipline striking workers at VW’s Spanish subsidiary SEAT, where 
management followed through on a threat to move work from Martortell (Barcelona) Bratislava 
(Slovakia) in 2002. Another example is Ford Spain, where management threatened to move work 
to Saarlouis with the aim of squashing local labor protest 
However, firms often refrained from explicitly threatening labor from shifting or withholding 
production, due to their desire to protect cooperative relations with labor and sometimes due to 
having less spare capacity. At Ford, for example, the more common pattern in Europe as well as 
in North-America has been informal whipsawing. From the 1990s on, following the spread of 
rumors about new investment decisions within Ford Europe, German worker representatives 
would approach management with an offer for concessions in exchange for securing production. 
The background of this was a general awareness in the firm of potential overcapacities and the 
likelihood of eventual plant closures, as well as developing management benchmarking 
practices, but at the same time a desire on management’s part to avoid disrupting partnership 
through raw coercion. It was this kind of whipsawing that led to concession bargaining in 
Germany in 1993 and 1997, which drove the convergence of previously higher company-level 
wages at Ford to that of the level of the sectoral collective agreement and provided legally 
enforceable guarantees of investment and production. These guarantees precipitated the end of 
Ford’s 'blue oval' auto production in the UK after more than 80 years. During the downturn of 
the European auto market at the end of the 1990s, Ford was forced to reduce production 
capacities. As the investments at the German production sites were protected, Ford decided to 
close the historic Dagenham plant.   
Rule-based whipsawing meant in some ways a further development of whipsawing. (Hauptmeier 
2011). Several firms on a particular platform would be invited to bid to produce a particular 
mode on the basis of costs and other criteria, and the plants whose bids did not succeed would be 
susceptible to closure. This was employed by General Motors in an attempt to increase the 
legitimacy and transparency of its drive for concessions after a Europe-wide work stoppages 
coordinated by the EWC. It was also used by VW after 1999 in its parts operations; plants would 
have to bid against external suppliers and adjust their labor costs accordingly.  
A further sophisticated way for management to secure the consent of worker representatives is 
hegemonic whipsawing, which became the dominant pattern at VW during the 2000s. Unlike 
informal whipsawing there were explicit threats formulated by management, but these threats 
took place in a broader context in which worker representatives considered them a legitimate 
way to keep different workforces ‘on their toes’ with a focus on staying competitive. This was in 
part due to management’s efforts to influence the ideas of worker representatives, partly through 
taking a more thorough engagement with worker representatives than at the other firms, and 
partly by providing worker representatives with salaries equal to those of top managers as well as 
numerous perks. The latter involved management payments for prostitutes in the context of 
works council meetings, which were illegal, caused scandal, and were later repudiated by the 
works council (Greer and Hauptmeier 2008). 
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It should be noted that the above-sketched organization of labor competition regularly coincides 
with the staging of two other forms of competition. First, MNCs set locations in competition to 
each in the context of new investment and production decision. Management asks politicians for 
subsidies in the form of infrastructure, training, social benefits or provision of land in exchange 
for new investments (Dörrenbächer & Geppert 2011). Since the latter involve jobs and economic 
growth that score highly in elections – especially in the auto industry, which is highly symbolic 
of industrial success – politicians are as susceptible to whipsawing as labor representatives. The 
staging of competition between locations can happen at different scales and cities, regions/states 
or nations have variously been pitched against each other with the aim of extracting subsidies. 
The EU has sought to limit this type of competition and made various subsidies illegal. However, 
the new EU regulations have not been very effective as could be seen during the financial crisis 
at the end of the 2000s, when different nation states subsidized automakers through scrappage 
bonuses and short working time benefits.  
Second, local managers from different plants are set in competition with each other in the context 
of investment decisions by regional or world headquarters of multinational companies. 
According to higher-level managers in large auto companies, local managers are inclined to use 
the introduction of new car models to upgrade machinery and robots, which can be costly for 
multinational companies. Because of these costs, local managers are also asked to submit a bid 
for new production, which is supposed to explain how much the roll out of a new car model 
would cost at a given plant and how existing machinery can be used in an efficient manner. The 
bids of local managers and labor concessions by workers representatives are regularly submitted 
to the headquarters of the multinational corporation at the same time. The staging of competition 
between different plants can have the effect that local managers and labor representative explore 
shared interests and engage in local productivity coalitions (Windolf 1989). 
Institutional effects: concession bargaining. While market-making rules allowed whipsawing to 
emerge as a management strategy, industrial relations rules failed to break the dynamic of 
whipsawing. To the contrary, they altered the workings of industrial relations by changing the 
function, meaning, and consequences of industrial relations institutions. The failure of the EWC 
directive to compensate is due, not so much to its low take-up rate (though this is a real problem 
[Kerkhofs 2006]), but rather due to its failure to give workers a voice in shaping the broader 
product market, to which MNC management was responding.  
The differences in national institutions governing worker participation gave national workforces 
varying degrees of access to management, both locally and internationally. This gave rise to very 
different cultures and expectations in the workers camp, which the European Works Council 
directive did little to blunt these dynamics. The restructuring of Rover by BMW was a notorious 
case of a failure to inform UK worker representatives of looming plant closures, despite the fact 
that German worker representatives had this information (Tuckman and Whittall 2002). Aside 
from very basic problems with implementing the directive in firms and dealing with the language 
barrier, national differences between members of EWCs gave rise to low levels of trust 
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(Timming 2006). This led to some creative efforts to promoting social partnership practices well 
in excess of the statutory minima set out in the directive and the national laws that implemented 
it (Greer and Hauptmeier 2008), including deliberate attempts to change ideas and promote a 
shared European identity (Whittall et al 2007; Greer and Hauptmeier 2012).  
National employment relations practices were altered by whipsawing, as firms used it to 
introduce forms of concession bargaining pioneered elsewhere. In Germany, for example, 
whipsawing was used to disrupt in various ways the former principle of encompassing and 
compressed pay scales, and allowed firms to introduce multi-tier wage structures. Pioneered in 
the US, multi-tier wage structures allowed firms to save money while protecting incumbent 
workers, but introducing reduced pay grades for selected and new groups of workers.  In 
response to management threats to produce a new vehicle, the Touran, outside of Germany, for 
example, worker representatives agreed to a project known as 5000x5000, which created new 
jobs for unemployed people at a lower pay grade (Schumann, Kuhlmann, Sanders, and Sperling 
2006). At Daimler in 2004, a threat to move production from Stuttgart to Bremen led to an 
agreement to reduce the pay of workers in auxiliary services, such as catering, cleaning, logistics, 
and security, which was presented as an alternative to outsourcing. Pay structures within auto 
plants became extremely complex, with additional concessionary agreements differentiating 
workers by seniority and function, as well as employer, with different pay levels for agency 
temps, contractors, and staff transferred due to joint ventures (Greer and Hauptmeier 2008). 
Another example is working time flexibilization. VW began to use working time flexibility as a 
primary mean to reduce labor costs in the 1990s. VW’s HR manager used the metaphor of the 
‘breathing company’: workforces were supposed to adapt production levels to the demand in the 
markets, which meant for example longer weekly working hours during peak demand in the 
summer and shorter weekly working time during the winter months with weaker demand.  VW 
introduced far-reaching working time flexibility across Europe in the 1990s; however, Spanish 
worker representative at SEAT resisted these changes, because they regarded a stable working 
week as a historic trade union gain, which they staunchly defended in several collective 
bargaining rounds during the 1990s. In 2002 VW asked once more for more working time 
flexibility and was again rebuked by local labor representative. Following the negotiations with 
labor VW made good on its threats and moved 10% of the production to the Bratislava plant in 
Slovakia within days. This came as a shock to the workforce and the allocation decision was 
only reversed once the labor representatives agreed to far-reaching working time flexibility in 
2004 (Hauptmeier and Morgan 2014).  
Worker responses. These dynamics led to considerable innovation by workers representatives. 
There was, for example, a proliferation of firm-level transnational agreements at Europe’s MNCs 
with the explicit aim of curbing social dumping by introducing certain norms (see Da Costa and 
Rehdfeldt 2007; Fichter et al 2011; Platzer and Rüb 2014). Some of them, including the first 
agreement which was at Ford’s spun-off parts operation, Visteon, covered topics not usually 
found in collective agreements such as sourcing by the assembler. Others had various 
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management mechanism built in to enforce the rules, including Daimler’s. At these firms, 
transnational worker representation was augmented well beyond the minimal practices envisaged 
in the EWC directive. At Daimler and VW, for example, there were several innovations aimed at 
improving transnational labor-management partnership, including the extension of the EWC to 
the global level, as a World Works Council (Greer and Hauptmeier 2008). 
At General Motors, the European Works Council developed a sophisticated internationalization 
strategy combining strong element of rank-and-file mobilization with demands for transnational 
collective agreements with management (see Fetzer 2008; Bernaciak 2010; Greer and 
Hauptmeier 2012). It intensified its work for some time in response management whipsawing 
and its own failures in responding and consciously sought to compensate for the failures of 
national action by shifting its activities to the transnational level, which meant improving 
communications and relations between its members. They met frequently, learned a common 
language (English), created a blog in which debates continued between meetings, and organized 
numerous bilateral exchanges between plants in different countries. Much of this work consisted 
of convincing rank-and-file workers the value of international work and involving them, via days 
of action. When management attempted to formalize the market for investment at the level of the 
‘platform’, the EWC responded by creating a ‘platform group’ whose members agreed not to 
bargain individually with management.  
These struggles, however, were limited in a number of ways. The story of labor transnationalism 
at GM Europe, for example, is one of a struggle against whipsawing and plant closures, and not 
the prevention of concessions. The solidaristic principle was to ‘share the pain’ not to reduce it. 
Furthermore, this principle was never fully realized in practice, since management did succeed 
over the years both in extracting local concessions and in closing plants. Often this undermined 
trust between worker representatives, since local agreements violated principles that had 
supposedly been agreed between worker representatives at the European level. There were 
therefore not only material conflicts of interest, but also fierce rivalries and enmities. These did 
not only divide workers by country, but also within country, as in the ongoing conflict between 
works councilors at Rüsselsheim and Bochum in Germany.  
Note as well that GM Europe was an unusually well-developed case of transnational worker 
representation. The more normal pattern for auto assemblers based in Germany, or whose 
European operations were centered on Germany, was for there to be far more labor-management 
cooperation. This meant at VW an acceptance of between-plant competition as something 
healthy; other times, like at Ford, it meant a more subtle dynamic of competition in which 
management did not normally have to issue clear threats. When it came to re-establishing 
solidarity the problem was therefore not usually just ineffectiveness; more often it was a lack of 
ambition. 
The economic crisis brought renewed state intervention, which not only stoked conflict between 
members of GM’s EWC, but also increased the broader political stakes at the national level (see 
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Bernaciak 2013, Fetzer 2011, and Klikauer 2012). In a dramatic turn of events in 2009, GM 
declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the US, solicited takeover bids for its European operations, 
and then reversed its decision and announced its own restructuring plans.  
This round of restructuring exacerbated tensions between worker representatives at GM and 
sidelined the EWC as an institution. This was not only because this round of restructuring was, 
even more than usual, certain to lead to plant closures, with winners and losers. It was also 
because members of the European works council were working publicly, and in close 
cooperation with national governments, to influence the outcome. German trade unionists 
publicly favored a takeover bid from a Canadian-Russian consortium with strong loan guarantees 
from the German state in exchange for guarantees of jobs and production in Germany. Trade 
unionists in Spain and the UK were opposed due to the guarantees of jobs in Germany and were 
relieved by the eventual outcome. Spanish unions went on strike against the threatened move of 
production to Germany and Tony Woodley, the leader of the British union UNITE, called on the 
European Commission to block the deal. In the end, plants were closed in Antwerp and Bochum, 
and the European headquarters moved from Zürich to Rüsselsheim. 
The European auto industry provides telling examples of what happens when market relations 
are imposed with little in the way of new countervailing social protections. What is remarkable is 
not that there are particular and conflicting interests in the labor camp that prevented a 
solidaristic settlement. Such conflicts of material interest are well-known and well-understood 
features of international trade. It is also not surprising that the institutions aimed to promote 
social dialog are inadequate in enabling workers to stand against wage-based competition. Just as 
national-level collective bargaining and co-determination rules proved to be inadequate for 
coping with an internationalized economy, EWCs at the scale of the firm were never going to be 
very useful for coping with the consequences of fierce competition at the scale of the product 
market. More interesting is that whipsawing, a high-profile example of social dumping with 
obvious and severe corrosive impacts on formerly egalitarian industrial relations institutions, 
could repeat itself for so long in a continent supposedly renowned for strong worker rights and 
social protections. Also remarkable are long-lasting attempts by trade unionists to fight 
whipsawing and build solidarity within an institutional framework so conducive to corporate 
divide-and-rule strategies. 
 
3. Implications for the social dumping debate 
What does our analysis of whipsawing as marketization have to do with the policy debate in 
Europe over social dumping? In our view, it has implications for understanding the actors and 
processes involved. While the term ‘social dumping’ has been used in many ways, a common 
way to discuss it is to point to low-wage countries passing unfair regulations that attract jobs 
from high-wage countries. Bernaciak (2012) provides a conceptual critique of this position; the 
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task here is to provide an empirical critique, propose a marketization-focused alternative, and 
suggest implications. 
Our analysis highlights differences between the crude version of the social dumping argument 
and the reality of the European automotive sector. First, the key actors driving the phenomenon 
of whipsawing are central management in multinationals, and to a lesser extent firm- and plant-
level worker representatives and local managers, and not national government in poor countries. 
The latter only rarely play a central role in whipsawing. States do matter, but it is more often the 
institutions, the sedimented results of past legislation, that shape these dynamics. They tend to do 
so in unintended ways, e.g. when works councils use their rights to democratic participation in 
the workplace to out-compete their counterparts elsewhere.  
The examples above show that competition is not merely between high-wage and low-wage 
countries, but is happening across the production system and product market. The decisions of 
management may be swayed by reductions in labor costs brought about by concessions, but there 
are other considerations as well, such as proximity to markets and labor productivity. Sometimes 
competition is within a country or between high-wage countries, and sometimes high-wage 
countries succeed in attracting jobs from low-wage countries. In addition, the high-wage/low-
wage division is in flux. Sometimes, as in the case of Spain, a low-wage country becomes a high-
wage country; and other times, as in the case with Poland and its neighbors to the south and east, 
a low-wage country finds itself in competition with even lower-wage countries. 
In addition, the moral dimension of whipsawing is more complex than the crude social dumping 
argument would have it. Whipsawing may be unfair in that it is used to extract concessions from 
workers and distribute resources to shareholders; but often managers try to make it legitimate in 
the minds of worker representatives, by taking seriously information and consultation 
mechanisms at the transnational level or creating a consistent framework of rules. Sometimes 
they succeed. The ethics of bargaining under a threat of plant closure are also far from clear-cut. 
While the problems created for workers by footloose capital are clear, the workers involved in 
any given case have to make a difficult decision over a trade-off between conceding past 
accomplishments of the labor movement and protecting regional jobs and manufacturing.  
The operationalization advocated here emphasizes a close link between marketization – in this 
case, transnational whipsawing by management – and social dumping. While whipsawing is 
enabled by the liberalization of markets for goods and capital across Europe, it is fundamentally 
driven by management. The decisions that shape worker outcomes are made by managers and 
not by politicians accountable to voters, bureaucrats accountable to politicians, or trade unionists 
accountable to members. While the function of industrial relations becomes the upward 
redistribution of resources in the name of securing jobs and an institutionally thick arrangement 
emerges within the corporation to stage market competition to ensure that this happens. The 
threat of exit has central importance in this kind of social dumping, and this process is governed 
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by the internal structures, rules and practices of the firm with an eye to increasing profitability or 
mitigating losses. 
One implication of this analysis is that any policy initiative to stop social dumping, and the 
resulting trend towards inequality in Europe, needs to deal with other market-making 
institutional changes. It may be that changes in taxation, industrial relations, welfare, or other 
areas of policy can compensate to a limited degree. But there is little evidence that they have 
reversed the overall trend, in part because states also make concessions in these areas to appease 
markets, or (more specifically) the powerful actors in markets such as managers in large 
corporations. In the auto industry, firms extract concessions from the state in the form of 
subsidies such as scrappage schemes, loan guarantees, infrastructure investment, and wage 
supports, on the eve of a pan-European drive for public-sector austerity. The policies that allow 
firms to extract these, by threatening exit in various ways, are market-making policies creating a 
global automotive sector.  
A second implication is that social regulation is needed at the level of the market. Because firms 
organize transactions – e.g. the exchange of concessions for investment – extending co-
determination rights is not irrelevant to whipsawing. But the experience in German automakers 
shows that this kind of social regulation is insufficient. To the extent that workers are integrated 
into the management of firms that are competing in saturated product markets, their 
representatives also internalize the demands of the market as co-managers and engage in 
concession bargaining. While markets are made to a large extent by states, the stories of 
production allocation sketched above show that the day-to-day working of competition is 
organized by private actors not subject to any sort of democratic accountability. 
It may seem naïve to propose bringing the marketizing face of European integration to a halt; but 
while marketization continues, it will be naïve to think that reforms in other areas might produce 
a ‘social’ Europe. Market change is a root cause and should be dealt with accordingly.  
 
  
13 
 
References 
Baccaro, L. and Howell, C. (2011). A Common Neoliberal Trajectory The Transformation of 
Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalism. Politics & Society, 39(4), 521-563. 
Bernaciak, M. (2010). Cross-border competition and trade union responses in the enlarged EU: 
Evidence from the automotive industry in Germany and Poland. European Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 16(2), 119-135. 
Bernaciak, M. (2012). Social Dumping: Political Catchphrase Or Threat to Labour Standards? 
Brussels: ETUI. 
Bernaciak, M. (2013). Labour solidarity in crisis? Lessons from General Motors. Industrial 
Relations Journal, 44(2), 139-153. 
Brinkmann, U. (2011). Die unsichtbare Faust des Marktes: betriebliche Kontrolle und 
Koordination im Finanzmarktkapitalismus. Berlin: edition sigma. 
Crouch, C. (2009). Marketization. In Hay, C. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of British Politics. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Culpepper, P. (2010). Quiet politics and business power: Corporate control in Europe and 
Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Da Costa, I. and Rehfeldt, U. (2007). European Works Councils and transnational bargaining 
about restructuring in the auto industry. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 
13(2), 313-316. 
Doellgast, V. (2012). Disintegrating democracy at work: labor unions and the future of good 
jobs in the service economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Doellgast, V., & Greer, I. (2007). Vertical Disintegration and the Disorganization of German 
Industrial Relations1. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 45(1), 55-76. 
Dörre, K., Lessenich, S. & Rosa, H. (2009). Soziologie, Kapitalismus, Kritik. Eine Debatte, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Emmenegger, P. (Ed.). (2012). The age of dualization: the changing face of inequality in 
deindustrializing societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fetzer, T. (2008). European works councils as risk communities: the case of General Motors. 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 14(3), 289-308. 
Fetzer, T. (2012). From nationalism to European patriotism? Trade unions and the European 
works council at General Motors. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(3), 342-357. 
14 
 
Fichter, M., Helfen, M., and Sydow, J. (2011). Employment relations in global production 
networks: Initiating transfer of practices via union involvement. Human Relations, 64(4), 599-
622.  
Greer, I. and Doellgast, V. (2013). Marketization, inequality, and institutional change. Working 
Paper. London: University of Greenwich. 
Greer, I. and Hauptmeier, M. (2008). Political Entrepreneurs and Co‐Managers: Labour 
Transnationalism at Four Multinational Auto Companies. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
46(1), 76-97 
Greer, I. and Hauptmeier, M. (2012). Identity work: sustaining transnational collective action at 
General Motors Europe. Industrial Relations, 51(2), 275-299. 
Greer, I. and Hauptmeier, M. (2012). Whipsawing: Organizing Labor Competition in 
Multinational Auto Companies. ILERA conference, July 2-5 , Philadelphia. 
Hauptmeier, M. (2011). Reassessing markets and employment relations. In P. Blyton, E. Heery, 
& P. Turnbull (Eds.), Reassessing the employment relationship (pp. 171-194). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.Hauptmeier, M. (2012). Institutions are what actors make of them – The 
changing construction of firm level employment relations in Spain. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 50(4), 737-759.  
 
Hauptmeier, M., & Morgan, G. (2014). Ideas and institutions - The evolution of employment 
relations in the Spanish and German auto industry. In M. Hauptmeier & M. Vidal (Eds.), 
Comparative political economy of work (pp. 162-185). London: Palgrave. 
 
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty; responses to decline in firms, organizations, 
and states. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Höpner, M., & Schäfer, A. (2010). A new phase of European integration: organised capitalisms 
in post-Ricardian Europe. West European Politics, 33(2), 344-368. 
Katz, H. C. (1985). Shifting gears: changing labor relations in the U.S. automobile industry. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Kerckhofs, P. (2006). European works councils: facts and figures 2006. ETUI-REHS. 
Klikauer, T. (2012). A General Motors works council’s response to the capitalist global financial 
crisis: A case study from Germany. Capital & Class, 36(2), 303-322. 
Lillie, N. (2010). Bringing the Offshore Ashore: Transnational Production, Industrial Relations 
and the Reconfiguration of Sovereignty. International Studies Quarterly, 54(3), 683-704. 
15 
 
MacKenzie, R., & Lucio, M. M. (2005). The Realities of Regulatory Change Beyond the Fetish 
of Deregulation. Sociology, 39(3), 499-517. 
Meardi, G. (2000). Trade union activists, east and west: comparisons in multinational companies: 
Aldershot/Burlington, Ashgate. 
Meardi, G. (2013). Social failures of EU enlargement: a case of workers voting with their feet. 
London: Routledge. 
Mueller, F., & Purcell, J. (1992). The Europeanization of manufacturing and the decentralization 
of bargaining: multinational management strategies in the European automobile industry. 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 3(1), 15-34. Schumann, M., Kuhlmann, 
M., Sanders, F., & Sperling, H. J. (2006). Auto 5000: ein neues Produktionskonzept. Die 
deutsche Antwort auf den Toyota-Weg? Hamburg: VSA. 
Ross, A. M. (1948). Trade union wage policy. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Timming, A. R. (2006). The problem of identity and trust in European works councils. Employee 
Relations, 28(1), 9-25. 
Tuckman, A. and Whittall, M. (2002). Affirmation, games, and insecurity: cultivating consent 
within a new workplace regime. Capital & Class, 26(1), 65-93. 
Turner, L. (1991). Democracy at work: changing world markets and the future of labor unions. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Vidal, M. (2013). Postfordism as a dysfunctional accumulation regime: a comparative analysis of 
the USA, the UK and Germany. Work, Employment & Society, 27(3), 451-471. 
Wagner, I. (2014). Rule Enactment in a Pan‐European Labour Market: Transnational Posted 
Work in the German Construction Sector. British Journal of Industrial Relations. 
Wagner, I., & Lillie, N. (2014). European integration and the disembedding of labour market 
regulation: transnational labour relations at the European Central Bank construction site. Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 52(2), 403-419. 
Whittall, M., Knudsen, H., & Huijgen, F. (Eds.). (2007). Towards a European Labour Identity: 
The Case of the European Works Council. London: Routledge. 
Windolf, P. (1989). Productivity Coalitions and the Future of European Corporatism. Industrial 
Relations, 28(1), 1.  
 
 
